Auctions typically involve the sale of many related goods. In many auctions/markets, the value of an object to a participant depends significantly on what other objects the participant acquires. This dependence is of two main types: complements and substitutes. For the complements case, there has been some concern that such auctions are too difficult to solve exactly. Some of these problems have even been (inaccurately) described as intractable. In this seminar, the use of linear programming/integer programming (LP/IP) based methods are described for solving in reasonable time, multi-object auctions. The seminar will also cover how to set prices when the buyer buys a bundle of objects.

• Transportation carriers
• Sale of pipeline capacity
• Multi-parcel real estate sales
• Course and job interview slows allocation in educational institutions
• Radio frequency spectrum sales
• Vacation time slow allocation
• Airport runway timeslot allocation
• Supplier specified-product bundling

• linear and integer programming knowledge

Dr. Linus E. Schrage, President of LINDO Systems and Professor of Operations Research and Operations Management at the University of Chicago. Dr. Schrage received his PhD in Operations Research from Cornell University and has an SB in engineering from St. Louis University and SM in industrial engineering from Cornell University. He has written several books including "Optimization Modeling with LINDO; Optimization Modeling with LINGO; and LINDO: an Optimization Modeling System; A Guide to Simulation.

LINDO Systems develops and markets a full range of optimization software from state-of-the-art high performance solvers to powerful modeling systems with extremely user-friendly interfaces. For more information go to: www.lindo.com.